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A vast literature uses cross-country regressions to find empirical
links between policy indicators and long-run average growth
rates. But conclusions from those studies are fragile if there are
small changes in the independent variables.
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n  ,  r  tS  i-  '  n
A  l3rge literat.ire  _ses cross-:ountry regressions to sea-rc!h 
linkages between Iong-r-n average growth rates anu a variety of  ec.=  ,
political, and institutional factors suggested by theory.  Most investigators
consider only a small number of explanatory variables in attempting to establish
a statistically  significant  relationship  between  growth  and  a particular
variable  of interest. For  example,  many  authors  who examine  the  relationship
between  m.easures  of fiscal  policy  and  growth  ignore  the  potential  importance  of
trade policy, while those authors  who study the empirical ties between trade and
growth commonly ignore the role of fiscal policy.1  Given that over 50 variables
have been  found  to be significantly  correlated  with  growth  in  at least  one
regression, readers may be uncertain 3s  to the confidence they should place in
the findings of any one study. 2 This paper addresses the question: How much
confidence should we have in the conclusions of cross-country growth
regressions?  We find that few findings  can withstand slight alterations in the
list of explanatory variables.
We use a variant of Leamer's (1983)  extreme bounds analysis to test the
robustness of coefficient estimates to the inclusion of other relevant
variables.  We study a large  number of variables that have be2n used as
explanatory variables in a broad collection of growth studies.  'n examin:ng  the
strength of the statistical relationship between each variable and  growth, we
add  explanatory  variables  that  have  been identified  as important  by the
1 Studies  of fiscal  policy  that  exclude  trade inoicators  include  Landau
(1983),  Ram (1986),  Grier  and Tullock  (1989),  and Barro (1990,  1991).  Feder
(1983)  and Edwards (1989)  study  trade policy  but ignore  fiscal  indicators.
Kormendi  and  Meguire  (;985)  and  Romer  (1990a)  include  variables  for  both.
2  See  Levine  and  Renelt's  (1990)  review  of  the  empirical  growth  literature.e.pirical growth .iteratur,.  The relationship between growth and a particular
variable of inter,st is considered robust if it remains statistically
-3gn.ficant  when other variables are included.  Even thcugh we try r.ot  to
;'.Jlude  variables that on a priori grounds measure the same phenomenon as the
variable of interes., almost all identified relationships become insignifi^ant
with the inclusion of only one additional variable, and many publicized
coefficients  actually  change  sign  when  other  explanatory  variables  are  added.
Two themes  emerge  from  our  investigation.  First,  measures  of economic
policy  are related  to long-run  growth. Taken  individ  Ally  or in groups.  there
are  many  cross-country  econometric  specifications  in  which  macroeconomic  policy
indicators  are significantly  correlated  with long-run  average  growth  rates.
The  second  theme  is that  the  cross-country  statistical  relationships
between  long-run  average  growth  rates  and  almost  every  particular  macroeconomic
indicator  considered  by the  profession  are fragile:  small  alterations  in the
.other'  explanatory  variables  overturn  past  results. In particular,  the  broad
array  of fiscal  expenditure  variables,  monetary  policy  indicators,  political
stability  indexes,  human  capital  and fertility  measures  coasidered  by the
profession  are  not robustly  correlated  with growth;  and  newer  indicators  that  we
have  assembled  to capture  exchange  rate,  tax,  and  fiscal  expenditure  policies
are  also  not  robustly  correlated  with growth. This  implies  that  there  is  n.ot  a
strong  independent  statistical  relationship  between  most  popular  macroeco-.o.:c
indicators  and  growth  even though  'policy'  - defined  broadly  - appears  to be
importantly  related  to  growth.
Besides  demonstrating  the  fragile  relationship  between  many policy
indicators  and  growth,  this  paper  clarifies  the  conditions  under  which  one  finds
evidence  of convergence  of per  capita  output  levels,  confirms  the  positive
2correlation  between  growth  and  the  share  of investment  in  GDP,  and takes  some
additional  steps  toward  improving  our  understanding  of the  complex  relationship
between  trade  and  growth. We find  that  the  ratio  of trade  to output  is
robustly,  positively  correlated  with the  investment  share  which  is in turn
robustly  correlated  with  cross-country  growth  rates.
Bofore  detailing  the  methodology  and  the results,  it is important  to
emphasize  this  paper's  bouneavies.  We do not  estimate  a structural  model,
establish  causal  links,  identify  growth  determinants,  make  policy
recommendations,  improve  the  measurement  of policy  indicators,  or run  the full
gamut  of sensitivity  analyses  discussed  by Leamer  (1985). We simply  examine
whether  partial  correlations  that  have  drawn  the  attention  of  a large  empirical
literature  are robust  or fragile  to small  changes  in the  list  of right-hand-side
variables. We find  that  they  are  generally  fragile.
II.  Methodology  and  Data
There  does  not  exist  a consensus  theoretical  framework  to guide  empirical
work on growth. Many researchers  begin  with a  neoclassical  production  function
and  add  variables  that  correspond  wi h their  views  of growth  (Feder  (1983)  and
Ram (1986)]. Others  use  endogenous  growth  models  that  highlight  a few  aspects
of growth  [Romer  (1989)  and  Barro (1990,  1991)]. Still  others  use  a variety  of
theoretical  models  to  motivate  an assortment  of  variables  that  they  use in
exploratory  empirical  studies  [Kormendi  and  Meguire  (1985)  and  Grier  and ,ullock
(1989)]. This  has produced  a diverse  and  sometimes  unwieldy  literature,  where
few  studies  control  for  the  variables  analyzed  by other  researchers.  One  cormmon
feature  of  most cross-country  growth  regressions  is that  they  are linear  (see:
Barro  (1990,  1991).  Kormendi  and  McGuire  (1985),  Grier  and  Tullock  (1989),  but
3also  see  Rcnier  (1989)): researchers  regress  the  average  growth  rate  for  a
samille  of  count  ies  on a g  oup  of  explanatory  variables  and foca;s  on  the
zoefficients  of one  or two  variables  of interest. This  paper  studies  whether  we
should  have  much  confidence  in the  conclusions  that  have  been  drawn  from  these
regressions.
Since  past  cross-country  studies  do not  provide  much  evidence  regarding
the  sensitivity  of their  findings  to small  alterations  in the  list  of
explanatory  variables,  this  paper  uses  a  variant  of Leamer's  extreme  bounds
analysis  to  examine  the  robustness  of a  variety  of  fiudingsw  described  in  the
empirical  growth  literature  (See  Leamer  (1983,  1985)  and  Leamer  and  Leonard
(1983)!. We first  describe  the  extreme  bounds  procedure  and  then  return  to
discuss  and  study  the  empirical  growth  literature.
As in  the  studies  we are  considering,  our  extreme  bounds  test is  based  on
linear  equations  explaining  output  growth  and  investment:
Y  =  siI  +  mm  +  U  (1)
where  Y is  either  per  capita  GDP  growth  or the  share  of  investment  in  GDP,  I  is
a set  of variables  that  are  always  included  in the  regression.  M is the  variable
of  interest,  and  Z is a subset  of variables  chosen  from  a large  pool  of
variables  identified  by past studies  as important  explanatory  variables  of
growth. Our  extreme  bounds  procedure  involves  varying  the  subset  of Z-variables
included  in  the  regression  to find  the  widest  range  of  coefficient  estimates  on
the  variable  of interest.  M, that  is  accepted  by standard  hypothesis  tests. In
particular,  we first  choose  a variable  that  has  been  the  focus  of past  empirical
studies,  M, and  veri.y  the  bi-variate  sign  and  significance  of these  past
4findings  w.th our  data  set. Then  we compute  the  regression  results  for  all
possible  linear  combinations  of up to three  Z-variables  and identify  the  highest
and lowest  values  for  the  coeffi-ienr-t  on the  variable  of interest,  3%, that  can
not  be rejected  at the  0.05  significance  level. 3 The  de ree  of confidence  that
one  can  have  in the  partial  correlation  between  the  Y and  M variables  can  be
inferred  from  the  extreme  bounds  on the  coefficient  SM  If  the  coefficient
remains  significant  and  of the  same  sign  at the  extreme  bounds,  then  one  can
maintain  a fair  amount  of confidence  in  that  correlation. In such  a case,  we
refer  to the  result  as "robust." If the  coefficient  does  not remain  significant
or the  coefficient  changes  sign,  then  one  might  feel  less  confident  in the
relationship  between  the  M and  Y variables. In  this  case,  we refer  to the
result  as 'fragile.'
One  possible  objection  with this  extreme  bounds  procedure  is  that  it
introduces  multicollinearity,  inflates  the  coefficient  standard  errors,  and
exaggerates  the  range  on the  coefficient  of interest. Leamer  (1978,  p.l 70-181).
however,  points  out  that  the  multicollinearity  problem  is really  a  weak-data
problem.  If  one is  unable  to find  robust  partial  correiations  in a cross-
section  regression  it simply  means  that  there  is  not  encugt,  independent
variation  in that  variable  to  explain  crcss-country  differences  in  growth. It
is only  when one  identifies  a significant  correlation  while  controlling  for
other  relevant  variables  that  one  can  have  much confidence  in the  correlation.
Nonetheless,  we restrict  the  extreme  bounds  procedure  in two  ways to avoid
some  potential  difficulties.  First,  to the  list  of  variables  always  included  in
the  extreme  bounds  regressions,  the  I-variables,  we only  allow  the  procedure  to
3  We add and  subtract  two standard  errors  to each  coefficient. Only the
actual  B's  are  reported  in  the  tables  with the  standard  errors.
5zhoose  up  to three  Z-variab'es  from  the  large  pool  of variables  identified  as
potentially  important  for  explaining  cross-country  growth  differentials.
Consequently,  we restrict  the  total  number  of explanatory  variables  included  in
any  one regression  to  be eight  or less. 4 The set  of variables  from  which  we
draw  combinations  of Z-variables,  however,  is larger  than  that  considered  by any
other  investigation.  The second  way  we limit  the  extreme  bounds  procedure  is
that  for  every  variable  of interest,  M.  we restrict  the  pool  of variables  from
which  we choose  Z-variables.  We exclude  variables  that,  a  priori,  measure  the
same  phenomenon. For  example,  when  we examine  the  relationship  between  growth
and  the rate  of domestic  credit  creation  over  the  1960-89  period,  we do not
allow  the inflation  rate  to be a Z-variable.  These  restrictions  make it  more
difficult  to implicate  past findings  as fragile. 5
The  data  are  primarily  from  the  World  Bank  National  Accounts  Data  Base
and,  when available,  cover  the  period  1960  to 1989.  The  data  set  includes  119
countries  but the  major  oil  exporters  are  excluded  from  the  analysis. Detailed
government  expenditure  and  tax  information  are from  the  International  Monetary
Fund's  Government  Financial  Statistics  and  begin  in  1974  for  most  countries.
Data  on  Jlack  market  exchange  rates,  measures  of educational  attainment.  civil
liberties,  etc.  are  obtainpd  from  a  variety  of sources  listed  in the  Data
Appendix. We also  use  Barro's  (1990,  1991)  data set,  which  is composed
primarily  of the  Summers  and  Heston  (1988)  data  set,  to compare  our  results  with
4 This total is similar  to that used  by Kormendi  and Meguire (1985)  and
less  than  Barro  (1991)  who  uses  between  eight  and  fourteen  explanatory  variables.
5 Also,  before labelling  a result  as 'robust,"  we conduct additional
sensitivity  analyse3  by examining  different  groups  of countries,  time  periods,
and  expanding  the  number  of  variables  that  can  be included  as Z-variables.
6other  papers. We find  similar  results  with the  two  data sets,  but  see  Kravis
and  Lipsey  (1990)  for  a comparison  of  the  two  data  sets.
III.  A Basic  Set  of Variables  for  Growth  Regressions  and  Some  Firs.  Results
The  choice  of the  included  variables,  '  was  based  on past  empirical
studies  and  economic  theory. When the  dependent  variable  is  the  average  annual
growth  rate  in  GDP per  capita  (GYP),  the  I-variables  are  the investment  share  of
GDP (INV),  the  initial  level  of real  GDP per  capita  in  1960  from  Summers-Heston
(RGDP60),  the  initial  secondary  school  enrollment  rate  as a proxy  for  human
capital  (SEC),  and  the  average  annual  rate  of population  growth  (GPO). Although
few  empirical  studies  include  all  of these  variables,  most studies  control  for
some  subset. Of 41 growth  studies  surveyed  in  Levine  and  Renelt  (1990).  33
included  the  investment  share,  29 included  population  growth,  13 included  a
human  capital  measure,  and 18 included  a  measure  of initial  income. In
addition,  Mankiw,  Romer,  and  Weil (1990)  empirically  show  that  the  variables  we
term "included-variables"  enter  with the  signs  predicted  by their  human-capital-
augmented  neoclassical  growth  L,odel,  and  the  included  variables  are  consistent
with a  variety  of "new"  growth  models  that  rely  on constant  returns  to
reproducible  inputs  or endogenous  technological  change  (e.g.,  Barro  (1990.  1991)
and  Romer (1989,  1990a)]. Furthermore,  v 4ith  these  I-variables,  we can  confirm
the  findings  of a large  assortment  of empirical  studies;  and,  in recognition  of
the  issues  raised  by  McAleer,  Pagan,  ard  Volker  (1985),  we show  that  small
changes  in  the included  variables  do  not  alter  this  paper's  conclusions.
There  are statistical  and  conceptual  problems  with  using  these  I-
variables. In  keeping  with this  paper's  focus  on assessing  the  statistical
fragility  of past findings,  we discuss  these  problems  only  briefly. Measurement
7problems  with initial  income  and secondary  school  enrollment  rates  may induce
biased  results. 6 In the  case  of population  growth,  census  data  may,  be  very
poor,  and  the  causal  links  with per  capita  output  growth  are  ambiguous  [Becker,
,Murphy,  and  Tamura  (1990)]. Furthermore,  in the  case  of secondary  school
enrollment  rates,  human  capital  represents  more than  formal  schooling,  and
enrollment  rates  do not  control  for  educational  qualiLy. Non.bheless,  other
measures  of education  (primary  enrollment,  literacy)  yield  similar  results. 7
There  are  also  problems  with including  the  ratio  of physical  capital
investment  to GDP  as an I-variable.  Th3  causal  relationship  between  growth  and
investment  is  ambiguous,  and  the  theoretical  justification  for  Licluding  many
variables  in  growth  regressions  is  that  they  may  explain  investment  If
investment  is already  included,  the  only  channel  through  which  other  explanatory
variables  can  explain  cross-country  per  capita  growth  differentials  is the
efficiency  of resource  allocation.  To partially  clarify  this  ambiguity,  we
investigate  the  ability  and  robustness  of  macroeconomic  'variables  of interest'
to  explain  the ratio  of  physical  investment  to  GDP.
6  For  example,  if  initial  income  is  mis-measured,  the  estimated  coefficient
on  initial  income  will be biased  towards  being  negative.  Romer (1989)  uses
instrumental  variables  for  initial  income  and  the  literacy  rate  and  finds  that
they become  insignificant. However,  it is unclear  that the instruments  used
(consumption  of newsprint  and  number  of radios  per  capita)  are  adequate  and  he
uses  literacy  rates  which  we find  are  not  as  strongly  correlated  with  per  capita
growth  as  primary  and secondary  school  enrollr  rates.
7  Secondary  enrollment  may be preferable  to primary  and literacy  rates
because  many countries  have reached  the  upper  bound  for  these  other  measures.
A  measure of average years of  schooling  of  the labor force aruund 1980
constructed  by Psacharopoulos  and Arriagada (1986)  was  found to be highly
correlated  with the  secondary  enrollment  ratio.
8The regression results with the I-variables  over the 1960-89 period are
GYP a  -0.83  - 0.35*RGDP60  - 0.38*GPO  +  3.17*SEC  +  17.5I1,W
(2)  (0.85)  (0.14)  (0.22)  (1.29)  (2.68)
R2 . 0.46  n  - 101.
The  coefficient  standard  errors  are  ir  parenthesis. The  variables  have the
signs  predicted  by a  wide class  of  models,  and  all  but  population  growth  are
significant  at the  0.05  significance  level. The  I-variables  explain  about  half
of the  cross-section  variance  in growth  rates.
Table  1 presents  extreme  bounds  tests  for  each  of the  I-variables  choosing
only  from  the  pool  of doubtful  variables  available  for  the  1960-89  period. The
investment  coefficient  is  positive  and robust. At the  lower  bound,  ti-e
coefficient  on the  investment  share  is 12.8  with  a t-statistic  of 4.2.  The
investment  coefficient  remains  significantly  positive  even  when  we allow  the
extreme  bounds  procedure  to  choose  five  Z-variables.  This  robust  positive
re'ationship  between  per  capita  GDP  growth  and  the investment  share  is in accord
with a  wide assortment  of growth  studies.
A second  important  finding  presented  in  Table  1 is the  robust  negative
partial  correlation  between  t'le  average  per  capita  growth  rate  over the  1960-
1989  period  and initial  income  in 1960. The  coefficient  on initial  income  is
often  used to test  the  convergence  hypothesis:  a  poor  country  - other  things
equal - tends to grow faster than a rich country. 8 DeLong (1988) and Romer
8 Anrther  definition  of convergence  is when the  cross-country  dispersion
of  per  capita  income  levels  declines  over  time. Poorer  countries  growing  faster
than  richer  countries  will lead  toward  reductions  in  dispersion,  but  new shocks
may  work in the  other  direction. See  Quah (1990)  and Barro  and Sala-i-Martin
(1990).
91987), for  example,  argue  that  there  is  little  empirical  support  for
convergence. In accord  with  Barro  (1991)  and  Mankiw.  Romer,  and  Weil (1990),
however,  we find  that  there  is  a robust  negative  correlation  between  growth  and
initial  income  if  one includes  population  growth,  the  investment  share  and
either  the initial  level  of secondary  school  enrollment  or the init  al level  of
primary  school  enrollment  as  proxies  for  the  initial  level  of  human  capital. 9
But, if  one  excludes  initial  human  capital  measures  or the investment  share,  the
correlation  between  growth  and  initial  income  is fragile. Thus,  although  there
are specifications  that  yield  evidence  of both  convergence  and  non-convergence,
we could  not  overturn  the  finding  of convergence  when  we included  population
growth,  the investment  share  and  the  initial  secondary  (or  primary)  school
enrollment  rates. When  we excluded  the  four  fastest  and four  slowest  growers
over the  1960-1989  period,  the  relationship  between  growth  and initial  income
remained  robustly  negative.10  Convergence,  however,  did  not  hold  very strongly
over  the  1974-1989  period.
Table  1 also  includes  extreme  bounds  tests  for  the  secondary  enrollment
rate  in 1960  and  population  growth. The  secondary  school  enrollment  rate  enters
with a significantly  positive  coefficient  if the  appropriate  Z-variables  are
chosen. But,  this  proxy  for  initial  human  capital  enters  insignificantly  with
other  plausible  specifications. 11 Thus,  one should  not  feel  very  comfortable
9  The  coefficient  on  initial  income  is  insignificant  for  some  specifications
if the  literacy  rate  is  used  to proxy  for  initial  human  capital.
10  However,  if  one  excludes  all  OECD  countries  the  results  are  not  robust:
the regression  with the I-variables  and the  average  inflation  rate  yields  an
insignificant  negative  coefficient  on initial  income.
11 These results  are unchanged  with primary school  enrollment  rates,
literacy  rates,  or the  educational  attainment  levels  computed  by Psacharopoulos
and  Arriagada  (1986). Also,  if  one  excludes  the  continent  dummies,  the  extreme
bounds  procedure  still  finds  that  education  variables  are  not  robustly  correlated
10concluding  that  'the  growth  rate  is  substantially  positively  related  to the
starting  amount  of human  capital.'  [Barro,  1991,  p.22)  Similarly,  one should
cautiously  interpret  Barro's  (1991)  conclusions  that  lower  fertility  rates  are
correlated  with faster  growth. For  some  specifications,  population  growth
enters  with  a significantly  negative  coefficient,  but it  enters  with a positive
but insignificant  coefficient  with  other  plausible  Z-variables.
The  extreme  bounds  of the  I-variables  are  also  computed  using  the
investment  share  as the  dependent  variable. As Table  1 illustrates,  none of the
coefficients  are  robust. In fact,  the  coefficient  on initial  income  takes-on
both  significant  positive  and  negative  values. Interestingly,  the  finding  of a
non-robust  relationship  between  initial  income  and  the  investment  share  combined
with the  finding  of a robust  negative  partial  correlation  between  initial  income
and  growth  (when  controlling  for  population  growth,  the investment  share,  and
initial  human  capital)  suggest  that  per  capita  income  convergence  does  not
operate  primarily  through  increases  in  domestic  savings  or international  capital
flows.
IV.  Macroeconomic  Variables  and  Growth
A. Illustrative  Overview
This  paper's  primary  aim is  to evaluate  the  degree  of confidence  one
should  have in the  partial  correlations  between  growth  and  popular  macroeconomic
indicators.  This  introductory  subsection  uses  two  relatively  comprehensive
studies  of growth  and some  simple  correlations  to illustrate  this  paper's  two
major  themes:  many indicators  of  policy  - taken  individually  or in groups  - are
with average  growth  rates.
11zorrelated  with growth,  but the  relationship  between  any  particular  indicator  or
group  of indicators  and  cross-country  growth  rates  is fragile. After  this
subsection  illustrates  these  findings,  the  following  subsections  conduct  a
systematic  series  of extreme  bounds  tests  to  determine  the  robustness  of past
findings.
Tables  2  and 3  anticipate  this  paper's  findings. Country's  that  grew
faster  than  average  over the  1960-89  period  tended  to  have  a higher  share  of
exports  in  GDP.  a higher  share  of investment  in  GDP,  larger  primary  and
secondary  school  enrollment  rates,  a lower  black  market  exchange  rate  premium,
and lower  inflation  rates  than  slower  growing  countries. Similarly.  Table  3
shows  that  the  investment  share,  the  export  share,  the  black  market  premium,  and
the indexes  for  revolutions/coups  and  civil  liberties  are  significantly
correlated  with the  average  real  per  capital  growth  rate.  Importantly,  however.
none  of these  variables  is significantly  correlated  with the  residuals  from  the
regression  of growth  on the  I-variables  (the  investment  share,  initial  income,
initial  secondary  school  enrollment  rate,  and  population  growth). Thus,  while
many  policy  indicators  are  significantly  related  to growth,  this  relationship
depends  importantly  on  what factors  are  being  held  constant.
Kormendi  and  Meguire  (1985)  and  Barro  (1991)  use  a  variety  of
macroeconomic  variables  to  explain  growth,  and  they  present  intuitively
appealing  results. Table  4  presents  equations  based  on these  studies. E<uat  cn
2 is  nearly  a replication  of  Barro's  (1991)  work and  includes  the  share  of
investment  in  GDP,  a  measure  of initial  human  capital,  population  growth.  and
initial  income  along  with the  ratio  of government  consumption  expenditures  to
GDP,  a dummy  variable  for  socialist  economic  systems,  indicators  for  revolutions
and  coups,  and  dummy  variables  for  Latin  America  and  Africa. Barro's  data is
12based  on Summers  and  Heston  (1988). All  variables  are  of the  anticipated  sign
3nd initial  income,  the  investment  share,  primary  school  enrollment  rate,
government  consumption  share,  revolution  and  coups  and  the  continent  dummies  are
significant.  Equation  3 is  based  on Kormendi  and  Meguire  (1985)  and includes
initial  income,  the  investment  to  GDP  ratio,  population  growth,  the  average
annual  growth  rate  in the  share  of government  consumption  to  GDP  over the  1960-
89 period,  the  average  annual  growth  rate  of domestic  credit,  the  standard
deviation  of domestic  credit  growth,  the  average  growth  rate  in the  share  of
exports  to  GDP,  and  a measure  of  civil  liberties.  As in  Kormendi  and  Meguire,
this  equation  uses  World  Bank  and  IMF  data.  The  coefficients  have the
anticipated  signs  and initial  income,  the  investment  share,  population  growth,
average  growth  rate  of domestic  credit  and  standard  deviation  of the  growth  rate
of domestic  credit  are significant  at the  0.05  level. The  equations  explain  68
and  61 percent  respectively  of the  cross-country  variation  in  growth  rates.
Since  both  equations  appear  reasonable  but  include  different  independent
variables,  readers  may  be  wary of the  findings  of each  study. To  highlight  this
quandary,  we combine  the  two  equations  using  the  union  of the  two  sets  of
explanatory  variables  used  by  Kormendi  and  Meguire  (1985)  and  Barro  (1991).
These  results  are shown  in  equations  4 and  5,  based  on World  Bank  and  Suzzrers
and  Heston  data respectively.  Only the  investment  share,  initial  income,  and
continent  dummies  remain  significant  with both  data sets. The standard
deviation  of domestic  credit  growth  remains  significant  with  World  Bank  data
while  the  government  consumption  share  and  the  revolution  and  coup  indicator  is
significant  with the  Sum=ers-Heston  data. Since  the  continent  dum=ies  simply
suggest  the importance  of omitted  variables,  the results  imply  that  only  the
share  of investment  in  GDP  and  the  initial  income  level  - out  of the  long  list
13of explanatory  variab:es  given  in  Table  4  - have  an independent,  statistically
significant  correlation  with cross-country  growth  differentials  computed  both
from  World  Bank  and  Summers  and  Heston  data.
These  results  suggest  that  many  popular  cross-country  growth  findings  are
sensitive  to the  inclusion  of explanatory  variables. More fundamentally,  they
illustrate  that  it is  very  difficult  to isolate  a strong  empirical  relationship
between  any  particular  macroeconomic  policy  indicator  and long-run  growth. The
subsections  that follow  systematically  examine  the  robustness  of fiscal  policy,
trade  policy,  monetary  policy,  and  political  stability  indicators  that  have  been
the  focus  of past  studies. In  addition,  we study  international  distortion  and
tax  indicators  that  have  not received  much attention.
B. Fiscal  Policy  Indicators
The  first  variables  that  we analy-e  using  the  extreme  bounds  procedure  are
fiscal  policy  indicators.  One  of the  most important  and frequently  studied
issues  in  economics  is  the  role  of fiscal  policy  in  economic  development.
Empirical  attempts  to link  aggregate  measures  of fiscal  policy  with average  per
capita  growth  rates  in  cross-country  studies  have tended  to  use (1)  measures  of
the  overall  size  of the  government  in  the  economy;  (2)  disaggregated  measures  of
government  expenditures;  or (3)  measures  of the  growth  rate  of government
expenditures.  In addition  to  examining  these  fiscal  indicators,  we examine  the
role  of government  deficits  and  disaggregated  measures  of government  taxes.
Before  presenting  our  results,  it is  worth  mentioning  some  problems  with
these  fiscal  policy  measures. Governments  may provide  growth-promoting  public
goods  and  design  taxes  to  close  the  gap  between  private  and  social  costs. On
the  other  hand,  governments  may  waste  funds,  funnel  resources  to  endeavors  that
14do not  encourage  growth,  and  impose  taxes  and  regulations  that  distort  private
decisions. Aggregate  measures  of government  size  will not  capture  the
potentially  important  implications  of  how total  government  expenditures  are
allocated. Furthermore,  even if  government  funds  are  always  spent  on growth-
promoting  goods,  there  may  be complex,  non-linear  tradeoffs  between  the
beneficial  effects  of government  services  and  the  deleterious  implications  of
distortionary  taxes  [see:  Barro  (1990)  and  Easterly  (1990)].12  Linear,  cross-
country  regressions  will not  appropriately  capture  these  relationships.  In
addition,  disaggregated  measures  of government  expenditures  and  tax  sources  are
only  available  for  a limited  number  of countries  since  the  1970s  and  are
particularly  prone  to  measurement  problems. Moreover,  since  government
resources  may  be spent  effectively  or ineffectively,  using  simple  expenditure
data  without  accounting  for  government  efficiency  may  yield  inaccurate  measures
of the  actual  delivery  of  public  services. While  recognizing  these  problems,  we
focus  on examining  the  robustness  of past  findings.
A common  measure  of the  role  of government  in  economic  activity  is the
ratio  of government  consumption  expenditures  to  GDP (e.g.,  Easterly  (1990),
Romer  (1989),  and  Landau  (1983)]. Table  5-A  reports  extreme  bounds  tests  of
this  variable  for  the  period  1960-1989.  The  coefficient  is  not  robust  although
the  estimated  coefficient  is  always  negative.13
12 See  Levine  (1991)  for  an analysis  of the  effects  of different  types  of
taxes  on long-run  growth.
13 Similar  results  were obtained  with the Summer-Heston  data set,  but if
the  extreme  bounds  procedure  is  prohibited  from  choosing  the  ratio  of government
investment  expenditures  to GDP as a Z-variable,  the relationship  is robustly
negative  (with  the  Summers-Heston  data  set).
15Although  subject  to  data limitations,  the  ratio  of total  governrent
expenditures  to GDP  is  perhaps  a more  complete  proxy  for  the  relative  size  of
the  government  in  economic  activity  than  the  ratio  of government  consumption
expendicure  to GDP. We compute  the  extreme  bounds  on the  ratio  of total
government  expenditures  to  GDP for  1974-1989. The  partial  correlation  with the
average  annual  growth  rate  of  per  capita  GDP  is  not robust. The  sign  of the
coefficient  remains  negative  but  becomes  insignificant  when  other  variables  are
added.
The  effect  of government  expenditures  on economic  growth,  however,  may
depend  on the  way in  which  funds  are  allocated,  not  merely  total  expenditures  by
the  government. Barro  (1991)  attempts  to  capture  this  difference  empirically  by
removing  education  and  defense  expenditures  from  government  consumption. In
Table  5-A,  we provide  extreme  bounds  results  using  the ratio  of government
consumption  less  defense  and  education  expenditures  to  GDP  over  the  1974-1989
period  during  which  IMF  data  is  available  for  a broad  range  of countries. Barro
(1991)  finds  this  measure  using  Summers  and  Heston  data to  be negatively
correlated  with growth  measured  over  the  period  1960-1985. We find  that  the
coefficient  on government  consumption  expenditures  less  defense  and  education
payments  is  always  negative  but  becomes  insignificant  when the  standard
deviation  of  domestic  credit  growth  and  the  Africa  dummy  are  added. 14
Continuing  to  examine  the  effects  of the  disaggregated  components  of total
government  expenditures,  we tested  in  turn  the  ratios  o, government  capital
formation,  government  education  expenditures,  and  government  defense
expenditures  to  GDP.  None  of these  variables  were robustly  correlated  with
14 We find that relationship  between  growth  measured  over the 1960-1989
period  and  the government  consumption  less  defense  and education  indicator
measured  over  the  1974-1989  period  is robustly  negative  as in  Barro  (1991).
16average  growth  rates  in a  cross-section  of countries. Interestingly,  given  the
strong  positive  relationship  between  the  share  of total  investment  in  GDP and
growth,  the  lack  of a robust  positive  correlation  between  government  investment
and  growth  suggests  that  the  returns  are lower  to  public  than  private
investment.
The  central  government  surplus  was used  to  explore  the  potential  negative
effects  of government  deficits. This  variable  enters  with a positive  and  robust
coefficient  when  we exclude  measures  of taxes. When  we allowed  the  extreme
bounds  procedure  to  control  for  the  mode of  government  financing,  however,  the
coefficient  on the  surplus  variable  becomes  insignificant  when the  ratio  of
export  tax  revenue  to  exports  and  the  black  market  exchange  rate  premium  are
included  as Z-variables.
The  growth  rate  of government  expenditures  was also  tested  because  Ram
(1986)  argues  that  this  measure  is  positively  related  to growth. An obvious
theoretical  problem  with this  is  that  if government  services  are  a  normal  good.
one  would  expect  growth  in government  services  to parallel  income  growth. This
measure  enters  with a  positive  but  not a robust  coefficient;  when the  average
annual  growth  rate  of exports  [studied  by Feder  (1983)]  and  the  change  in
exports  as a share  of  GDP [studied  by Romer  (1989a)]  are  included,  the
coefficient  on the  growth  rate  of government  consumption  expenditures  becomes
insignificant.  The  high r-square  of this  equation  (.98)  suggests  that  one  only
need  put  in the  growth  rates  of enough  components  of  GDP to  explain  the  cross-
section  variance  in growth.
Extreme  bounds  tests  of the  ratio  of export  tax  receipts  to  exports,  the
ratio  of import  tax  receipts  to imports,  the  ratio  of corporate  tax  receipts  to
GDP,  and  the  ratio  of individual  income  tax  receipts  to  GDP  did  not  yield  any
17robust  relationships.  The  coefficient  on  each  of these  variable  changes  sign
when the  Z-variables  are  changed.
The  second  part  of Table  5-B  presents  extreme  bounds  t  of fiscal
indicators  with the investment  share  as the  dependent  variable. Although  many
theoretical  predictions  of a negative  relationship  between  the  size  of the
government  and  growth  are  based  on a  negative  impact  of government  activity  on
capital  accumulation,  none of the  fiscal  policy  measures  has a robust
relationship  with the investment  share. Indeed,  the  total  expenditure  and
government  consumption  measures  were  actually  positively  related  to the
investment  share.
In this  subsection,  we could  not find  a robust  cross-country  relationship
between  a diverse  collection  of fiscal  policy  indicators  and  growth.
Specifically,  although  there  are  econometric  specifications  that  yield
significant  coefficient  estimates  between  specific  fiscal  policy  indicators  and
growth,  the  coefficients  on these  same  variables  become  insignificant  when the
right-hand-side  variables  are  slightly  altered. Interestingly,  standard  fiscal
indicators  entered  with the  predicted  sign  for  many  econometric  specifications
when investment  was included  in the  regression  but these  same  indicators  were
insignificantly  related  to investment  (or  they  entered  with the 'wrong'  sign)
Thus,  fiscal  policy  - to the  extent  that  it  has  an independent  relationship  with
growth  - is  correlated  with the  'efficiency  of resource  allocation'  as opposed
to the  accumulation  of physical  capital. These  results  suggest  that  the
interactions  between  fiscal  policy,  investment,  and  growth  may  be  more
complicated  than  can  be captured  in simple  linear  models  using  fairly  aggregate
measures  of fiscal  activity.
18C. International Trade and Price Distortions
Over two hundred years ago Adam Smith argued that o-enness to
international markets  could enhance productivity by encouraging specialization
that would be unprofitable in smaller  markets.  Recently, this argument and
other theoretical ties between trade and growth have been formalized by Rivera-
Batiz and Romer (1989),  Grossman and Helpman (1989c), and Romer (1986, 1990b).
Although  theoretical  discussions  frequently  focus  on the  relationship  between
international  trade  and  growth,  empirical  examinations  have typically  examined
the  relationship  between  exports  and  growth. Consequently,  we examine  the
robustness  of export  indicators  used in  past  studies. In  addition,  we examine
the  relationship  between  growth  and import  indicators,  total  'rade  indicators,
and  more direct  estimates  of trade  policy  and  the  distortion  between  domestic
and international  prices.
Three  important  results  emerge  from  these  extreme  bound  tests. First,  if
one substitutes  imports  or total  trade  for  exports  in  cross-country  growth  or
investment  regressions  one  obtains  essentially  the  same  coefficient  estimate  and
coefficient  standard  t  ror.15 Thus,  researchers  who identify  a significant
correlation  using  an export  performance  measure  should  not  associate  this  result
with exports  per se,  because  it  could  be obtained  using  a corresponding  measure
of imports  or total  trade. Second,  the  share  of trade  in  GDP is  robustly
positively  correlated  with the  share  of investment  in  GDP. 16 Finally,  when
controlling for the share of investment in GDP, we could not find a robust
15  Although  this  result  may not  be surprising,  it seems  to be frequently
overlooked  as  many  authors  interpret  their  results  as establishing  an  exclusive
relationship  between  exports  and  growth.
16 The black  market exchange  rate premium is negatively  - though  not
strictly  robustly  - correlated  with  the investment  share.
'9independent  relationship  between  any  trade  or internationa.  price  distortion
indicator  and  growth.17 These  three  results  indicate  that  an important  part  of
the relationship  between  trade  and  growth  is  based  on erhanced  resource
accumulation  and  not  necessarily  on the  Lmproved  allocation  of resources.
The  major  results  are in  Table  6.  Two  measures  of trade  performance  that
have  received  considerable  attention  are the  export  share  of  GDP  and the  growth
rate  of the  export  share. The  results  suggest  that  there  is little  link  between
-he  export  (or  import  or trade)  share  and  growth  once  investment  is  controlled
for  as  none  of the  coefficients  are  significant.  Measures  of export  share
growth,  import  share  growth,  and  total  trade  share  growth  were tried  and  also
found  to  be insignificantly  related  to  growth.
Arguing  that  exports  have  important  externality  effects,  Feder (1983)  uses
export  growth  and  export  growth  times  the  share  of exports  in  GDP to  explain
cross-country  growth  differentials.  Table  6-A  presents  results  showing  that
export  growth  zs  not robustly  related  to  growth  when government  growth  variables
are included. Similar  results  hold  for  exports  multiplied  by export  share  or
when  we substitute  imports  or total  trade  for  exports. Given  the  national
accounts  identity,  even  if  we found  a robust  relationship,  it is  not  clear  wh3t
worthwhile  inferences  could  be drawn.
Romer  (1990a)  finds  a strong  link  between  the  export  share  and investment.
We confirm  this  result. The  extreme  lower  bound  still  indicates  a significant,
positive  correlation  between  the  investment  and  export  shares. The  Summers-
Heston  data  set  produced  similar  results. Total  trade  was also  tested  and  the
trade-investment  link  was still  robust. Since  outliers  may be especially
17  Dollar's  (1990)  measure  of the  distortion  between  domestic  and  foreign
prices,  however,  is  negatively  - though  not  strictly  robustly  - correlated  with
long-run  average  growth  rates.
20important  with this  measure  (i.e.  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore  have  exportlGDP  ratios
yreater  than  one),  countries  with  export  shares  greater  than .75  were  dropped.
"he  export  share  remained  robust  in  explaining  investment.18  The  export  share
was also  found  to be robust  in  the  growth  equation  when investment  was dropped.
These  results  suggest  an important  two-link  chain  between  trade  and  growth
through  investment. Interestingly,  however,  the  theoretical  ties  between  growth
and  trade  typically  seem  to run  through  improved  resource  allocation  and  not
through  a  higher  investment  share.
We also  examined  more  direct  measures  of trade  policy. Leamer  (1988)  uses
the  Hecksher-Ohlin-Vanek  trade  model  to  construct  measures  of 'openness,  and
'intervention."  The intervention  index  represents  the  deviation  between  the
actual  and  predicted  pattern  of trade. The  openness  index  represents  the
difference  between  the  actual  and  predicted  level  of trade  (as  opposed  to the
pattern  of trade). The  openness  index  is  constructed  so that  a higher  value
represents  more 'openness."
As Table  6-A indicates,  neither  Leamer's  (1988)  intervention  or openness
indexes  is robustly  correlated  with  average  long-run  growth  rates  when the I-
variables  are included  ir  the  regression.  Both  of Leamer's  indexes,  however,
are robustly,  positively  correlated  with the  investment  share  as depicted  in
Table  6-B.  On the  one  hand this  is  not surprising  because  both  of Leamer's
indexes  are  highly  (e.g.,  0.70)  and  significantly  (at  the  0.01  level)  correlated
with the  share  of trade  in  GDP,  which  we found  to  be significantly  correlated
with the investment  share. On the  other  hand,  these  results  are  difficult  to
18 When the extreme  bounds  test is done on the subset  of countries  for
which  disaggregated  tax  data  exist  (over  the  1974-1989  period),  the  coefficient
on the export share becomes insignificant  when the ratio of corporate  tax
receipts  to  GDP is  included.
21interpret  because  the  intervention  and  openness  indexes  are  positively  (e.g.,
D.63)  and significantly  (at  the  3.01  level)  correlated  with  each  other. 19
We also  examine  measures  of international  price  distortions. Dollar
(1990)  constructs  an index  of the  distortion  between  domestic  and  international
prices  (1976-1985)  from  the  Sunmers  and  Heston  data  set.  This  'rpal  exchange
rate  distortion'  index  is significantly  positively  correlated  with the  black
m3rket  exchange  rate  premium,  but  it is  negatively  correlated  with the  ratio  of
trade  to GDP.  These  correlations  plus  the  analysis  by  Pritchett  (1990)  suggest
that  one  may  want to interpret  Dollar's  (1990)  index  as a general  measure  of
international  distortions  and  not  a narrow  measure  of trade  policy.
Table  6-A  shows  that  Dollar's  index  is  negatively  though  not  robustly
correlated  with  growth  when the  extreme  bounds  procedure  is  allowed  to choose
the  African  and  Latin  American  continent  dummies  and  the  average  fiscal  deficit
to GDP ratio. If the  continent  dummies  are  excluded,  however,  the  partial
correlation  between  growth  and  the  real  exchange  rate  distortion  index  is
negative  and robust. But,  if  one restricts  the  analysis  to  countries  for  which
Summers  and  Heston  actually  collect  price  data (the  benchmark  countries)  and
excludes  those  countries  for  which  extrapolation  technit,.es  were employed  to
construct  price  data,  the  results  are  not  robust. If  one  adds  the  government
consumption  less  defense  and  education  spending  to GDP  ratio  to the  I-variables,
the  coefficient  on the  distortion  index  becomes  insignificant.
Finally,  we examine  the  average  blacK  market  exchange  rate  premium. Since
this  variable  represents  the  interactions  of  many  policies,  it is  very  difficult
19 After  carefully  examining  the  relationship  between  different  measures
of trade  policy,  Pritchett  (1990)  concludes  that the "alternative  objective
summary  measures  of  policy  outward  orientation  produce  entirely  different  country
rankings .,..  (p. 29) Thib assessment  has obviously  dour implications  for
attempts  to  quantify  the  relationship  between  trade  policy  and  long-run  growth.
22to  interpret  this  variable  as an indicator  of any  one  policy. From  Table  6, the
b2.ack  market  exchange  rate  premium  is  not robustly  currelated  with growth  or the
investrent  share.20 It  does,  however,  take  three  additional  variables  to  make
the  partial  correlation  of  the investment  share  with the  black  market  premium
insignificant.  Thus,  this  conglomerate  index  of policy  distortions  does  have  a
generally  negative  relationship  with the  investment  share.
D.  Monetary  and  Politica:  Indicators
This section  examines  the  empirical  relationship  between  long-run  average
growth  rates  and  measures  of  monetary  policy  and  indicators  of the  political
climate. Previous  researchers  have  explored  the  relationship  between  measures
of  monetary  policy  and  growth. Kormendi  and  Meguire  (1985)  find  that  the  growth
rate  of inflation  and  the  standard  deviation  of money  supply  shocks  are
negatively  related  to  growth.  Grier  and  Tullock  (1989)  find  that  the  standard
deviation  of inflation  is  negatively  related  to  growth  using  a  pooled  cross-
section,  time-series  analysis. The  regression  results  in Table  4  already
suggest  that  these  results  are sensitive  to the  chosen  econometric
specification.  Table  /  indicates  that  the  average  growth  rate  of domestic
credit  and  the  standard  deviation  of Inflation  are  not robustly  correlated  with
growth  or the  investment  share. In fact,  the  standard  deviation  of the
inflation  rate  is actually  positively  related  to the  investment  share  for  a
variety  of econometric  specification.  We also  tried  inflation  and  measures  of
the  growth  rate  of various  monetary  aggregates  and  found  similarly  fragile
results. Of course,  these  measures  of  monetary  policy  may be simplistic.  Thus.
20 Similar  results  were found  for  just  developing  countries.
23future  theoretical  and  empirical  work  should  focus  on deriving  empirically
testable  predictions  regarding  monetary  policy  and long-run  growth.
The  profession  has  also  used  a variety  of  political  indicators  in
searching  for  explanations  of long-run  growth. Kormendi  and  Meguire  (1985)  find
that  greater  civil  liberties  are  positively  related  with growth,  while  Barro
(1991)  finds  that  war and  revolutions  decrease  growth. We find (Table  7) that  a
revolutions  and  coups  index  (REVC)  and  the  Gastil  index  of civil  liberties
(CIVL)  are  not  rob  'tly  correlated  with long-run  economic  growth  rates,  and the
coefficients  on these  political  indicators  experienced  sign  changes  when the  Z-
variables  are  changed. The  revolution  and  coup  indicators,  however,  is
robustly,  negatively  correlated  with the  investment  0hare  if the  extreme  bounds
procedure  is  not allowed  to include  the  index  of civil  liberties  (Table  7).
Thus,  not surprisingly,  countries  that  experience  a  high  number  of revolutions
and  coups  tend  to be countries  that  invest  less  of their  resources  than
countries  with stable  political  environments.
V. Sensitivity  of the  Sensitivity  Analysis  and  Variable  Groupings
The selection  of the  I-variables  was  based  on theoretical  grcunds,  past
empirical  findings,  and  the  ability  to replicate  past  finding  with this  set  of
included  variables. Nonetheless,  we examined  the  robustness  of our findings  to
alterations  in  the  I-variables.  We conducted  the  entire  series  of extreme
bounds  procedures  with two  alternative  sets  of I-variables.  The first  set is
the  original  I-variables  plus  the  African  and  Latin  American  dummy  variables.
We add  the  continent  dummies  because  a number  of  previous  researchers  have found
significant  effects  for  African  and  Latin  American  dummy  variables  (See  Barro
(1990,  1991),  Romer  (1989,  1990a),  and  Grier  and  Tullock  (1989)]. The  second
24alternative  set  of I-variables  includes  only  the  investment  share  because
initial  income,  population  growth,  and  education  may be  particularly  poorly
measured. The  alternative  choices  of the  I-variables  did  not  alter  the results.
In addition,  we examined  the  importance  of  maximizing  the  difference  in
the  3m's  rather  than  the  difference  in  bounds  (Bm's  plus two  coefficient
standard  errors)  to isolate  the  source  of our  fiindings.  We found  that  this
alteration  in the  extreme  bounds  procedure  did  not  alter  the results. This
suggests,  as  does the  fact  that  coefficient  standard  errors  are  generally
similar  between  upper  and lower  bounds,  that  alterations  in  the  Z-variables
change  the  estimated  betas  more than  the  standard  errors. Thus,  when this
procedure  identifies  a past  result  as fragile,  this  is  because  it finds  a
different  coefficient  estimate  not  a different  coefficient  standard  error.
Finally,  we made some  attempts  to  gauge  the  notion  that  policies  should  be
interpreted  more  broadly  than  any  particular  measure  of fiscal,  trade,  or
monetary  performance  can  capture. For  example,  the  black  market  exchange  rate
premium  is related  to  exchange  rate  policy,  monetary  policy,  trade  policy,  and
political  incertainty,  thus  it  may  be 'unfair'  to include  other  policy
indicators  while  examining  the  partial  correlation  between  the  black  market
premium  and  long-run  growth  rates. Of course,  if  a significant  coefficient  is
then  found  when  other  policy  indicators  are  excluded,  the  significance  should
not  be interpreted  as representing  a correlation  between  growth  and  the  black
market  premium  per  se,  but  between  growth  and  a general  indicator  of
'distortions.'  Consequently,  we used factor  analysis  to  construct  'aggregate
policy  indicators'  from  groups  of individual  policy  indicators.  For  example,  we
tested  the  robustness  of  various  'international'  distortion  indexes,  'domestic'
25distortion  indexes,  and 'uncertainty^  indexes  constructed  from  up to four
individual  indicators.  None  were robustly  correlated  with  growth. This  again
indicates  the  difficulty  of isolating  the  independent  importance  of any single
policy. National  policies  appear  to be a  complex  package.  and future  research
may  wish to focus  on  macroeconomic  policy  regimes  as opposed  to  any  particular
policy.
VI.  Conclusion
Theoretical  and  empirical  research  on  economic  growth  suggest  a number  of
channels  through  which  macroeconomic  policies  may affect  long-run  growth. We
employ  a version  of  Leamer's  extreme  bounds  analysis  to  test the  robustness  of a
wide assortment  of  macroeconomic  indicators  in  explaining  cross-country  growth
differentials.  We find  that  very  few  macroeconomic  variables  are  robustly
correlated  with  cross-country  growth  rates. We do,  however,  identify  some
correlations  that  are - with some  qualifications  - robust  to  slight  alterations
in  the list  of independent  variables. This  will  hopefully  provide  useful
information  for  future  theoretical  and  empirical  work.
We briefly  summarize  our findings:
(1)  We found  a positive  and robust  correlation  between  average  growth  rates
and  the  average  share  of investment  in  GDP.
(2)  We found  a positive  and  robust  correlation  between  the  share  of  investment
in  GDP  and  the  average  share  of trade  in  GDP  over the  1960-1989  period.
(3)  In terms  of the  convergence  hypothesis,  we found  a negative  and robust
correlation  between  the  level  of initial  income  and  growth  when investment
and  a measure  of the  initial  level  of  human  capital  are included  and the
equation  is  estimated  over  the  1960-1989  period.
26(4)  We found  that  all findings  using  the  share  of exports  in  GDP  could  be
obtained  almost  identically  using  the  total  trade  or import  share. Thus,
cross-country  growth  studies  that  use  export  indicators  should  not  be
interpreted  as studying  the  relationship  between  growth  and  exports  per se
but rather  as between  growth  and trade  defined  more  broadly.
(5)  We found  that  many fiscal  indicators  are  not robustly  correlated  with
growth. Total  government  expenditures  as a fraction  of GDP,  government
consumption  expenditures  as a share  of  GDP,  government  consumption
expenditures  less  defense  and  education  spending  as a fraction  of  GDP. the
average  growth  rate  of government  expenditures,  the  growth  rate  of the
share  of government  expenditures  in  GDP,  and  deficits  were found  not to  be
robust  in  explaining  growth. Also,  disaggregated  measures  of fiscal
expenditures  - public  investment  expenditures,  education  expenditures,  and
defense  expenditures  as a shares  of GDP  - were  not robustly  correlated
with growth. Similarly,  disaggregated  tax  revenue  data - the  ratio  of
export  taxes  to  exports,  the  ratio  of import  taxes  to imports,  the  ratios
of corporate,  individual,  and  social  security  taxes  in  GDP - were  not
robustly  correlated  with growth.
(6)  A variety  oi measures  of trade  - average  growth  rates,  shares  of GDP,  and
average  growth  rates  of shares  - were found  to  not  be robustly  correlated
with growth  when the investment  share  is included.
(7)  Finally,  a large  assortment  of other  economic  and  political  variables  were
found  not to be robustly  correlated  with  growth  including  measures  of
investment  in  human  capital,  the  average  black  market  exchange  rate
premium,  the  standard  deviation  of the  black  market  premium,  the  average
inflation  rate,  the  standard  deviation  of the  inflation  rate,  the  average
274r.swtw  rate in 'omestic  creJlt, the standard deviaticn in the growth rate
d'.mest  c  creAit, measures of  civil liberties, coups,  soc:alist
e~ccnccmes,  mixed ecor.nomes,  etc.  The indicator of revolutions and coups
is negatively correlated with the investment share.
Using a linear framework,  we have tried to distinguish partial growth
correlations that seem robust from those that are fragile.  We find that
although there are many econometric specification in  which macroeconomic policy
indicators - taken individually  or in groups - are significantly correlated  with
growth, the cross-country statistical relationship between long-run  average
growth rates and almost every particular macroeconomic policy indicator are
fragile.  These results suggest that there is not a strong independent
statistical relationship between popular macroeconomic policy indicators and
growth even though 'policy' defined  more broadly is importantly related to
growth.  Econometrically, this paper highlights the importance of considering
alternative specifications in cross-country growth regressions.  Finally,  we may
need  to go  beyond  aggregate  macroeconomic  indicators  in  linear  cross-country
growth  regressions  to  more  fully  understand  economic  growth.
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31Data Set Variables and Sources
AFR::A  Cunny for Subsaharan Africa
AREA  Land area (e.OCs  sq KM)
S  :'BSI
tM.P  Black Market Exchange Rate Premium
S:Picks Currency Yearbook, Wood ('38),  WB updates
2MS  Standard rev. BMP
2CC qr.)  Central Government Gross Capital Formation
S:IMFGFS
Z'VL  Index of Civil Liberties
S:Gastil, Barro
TX (L)  Ratio Central Govt Corporate Income Tax Revenue to GDP
S:IMFGFS
DEE (L)  Ratio Central Govt Defence Expenditure to GDP
S:IMFGFS
DEF (L)  Ratio Central Govt Deficit to GDP
S:IMFGFS
RERD  Real Exchange Rate Distortion
S:Dollar (90),  Calculated with SH
RERDB  RERD for SH benchmark countries
EDE (L)  Ratio Government Educational Expenditures to GDP
S:IMFGFS
SDC  Growth rate of Domestic Credit
S:  IMFIFS
SGCFD  Government Capital formation  deflated with SH prices
S:Barro from IMFGFS, Summers-Heston (88) [SH]
GG  Growth of government consumption expenditures
S:WE`NA
GM  Growth of imports
S:WBNA
GOV  Government Consumption share of GDP
S:WBNA
GV'X (L)  Government Consumption less  Defense and Education share of
GDP
GOV  - DE  - EDE
CPO  Growth of Population
S :WE  SI
:CR  Growth of real per capita GDP
S:SH
CSG  Growth of the Share of Government
S:Growth of Share of Government Consumption
3X  Growth of Exports
S:WBNA
GYP  Growth of per capita GDP
S:WBNA
HSGVX  Share real Government Consumption expenditures minus defense
education expenditures
S:Barro from SH,IMFGFS
INV  Investment share of GDP
S:WBNA
ITX  (L)  Share of central govt individual  income tax  to  GDP
S:IMFGFS
LAAM  Dummy variable for Latin America
1 n'EAM1  Measure of overall trade openness
S:Leamer (88)
'EAM2  Measure of overall trade intervention
S:Leamer (88)
LIT  Literacy rate in 1960
S:WBSI
MIX  Dummy variable for mixed government
S:Gastil, Barro
MSG  Growth of import share
S:WBNA
MTX (L)  Ratio of import taxes to imports
S  :IMFGFS,  IMFIFS
MP  Measure of openness based on import penetration
S:Residuals of regres. of M on RGDP60(&sqr),AREA,POP
K  Import share of GDP
S:WBNA
OECD  Dummy for OECD
OIL  Dummy for OPEC
PI  Average inflation  of GDP deflator
S:WBNA
POP70  Population in 1970
S:SH
PRI  Primary enrollment rate 1960
S:Barro from UNESCO.ILO
PRJ  Primary enrollment rate 1970
S:Barro from UNESCO,ILO
REVC  Number  of  revolution  and coups per year
S:Barro from Banks
RGDPxx  Real GDP per capita in l9xx
S:SH
SCOUT  Dummy for outward orientation based
S:Syrquin and Chenery (88)
SEC  Secondary enrollment rate 1960
S:Barro from UNESCO,ILO
SED  Secondary enrollment rate 1970
S:Barro from UNESCO,ILO
SGOV  Real Government Consumption Share
S:SH
SINV  Real Investment Share
S:SH
SOC  Dummy for socialist economy
S:Barro from  Gastil
SST  (L)  Ratio  Social  Security  taxes to GDP
S:IMFGFS
STDD  Standard  Deviation  of  GDC (growth  domestic  credit)
S:IMFIFS
STDI  Standard  Deviation  of  PI (inflation)
S:WBNA
TAX (L)  Ratio central government tax revenue to GDP
S:IMFGFS
TEX (L)  Ratio total government expenditure to GDP
S:IMFGFS
TRD  Ratio  total  trade  (X+M)  to  GDP
S:WBNA
XSG  Growth of export share of GDP
33S: WBNA
XTX (L)  Ratio  central  govt  export  tax  revenue  to  exports
S t WGFS
X  Export  share  of GDP
SsWBNA
YRSCH  Average  years  of schooling  of labor  force  el980
S:Psacharopoulos  and  Arriagada  (86)
WBNA  World  Bank  National  Accounts  Database
WBSI  World  Bank  Social  Indicators
IMF  IFS  International  Monetary  Fund  -International  Finance  Statistics
IMF  GFS  International  Monetary  Fund--Government  Finance  Statistics
(L)  indicates  only  available  for  1974-1989  period
34Country List
119 Country Sample
AFG Afghanistan  40  HTI  Haiti  80  PRY  Paraguay
2  DZA Algeria  41  HND  Honduras  81  PER  Peru
3  AGO Angola  42  HKG  Hong Kong  82  PHL  Philippine
4  ARG Argentina  43  ISL  Iceland  83  PRT  Portugal
5  AUS Australia  44  IND  India  84  RWA  Rwanda
5  AUT Austria  45  IDN  Indonesia  85  SAU  Saudi Arab
7  BGD Bangladesh  46  IRN  Iran  86  SEN  Senegal
8  BRB Barbados  47  IRQ  Iraq  87  SLE  Sierra Leo
9  BEL Belgium  48  IRL  Ireland  88  SGP  Singapore
10  BOL Bolivia  49  ISR  Israel  89  SOM  Somalia
11  BWA Botswana  SO  ITA  Italy  90  ZAF  South Afri
12  BRA Brazil  51  JAM  Jamaica  91  ESP  Spain
13  BDI Burundi  52  JAP  Japan  92  LKA  Sri Lanka
14  CMR Cameroon  53  JOR  Jordan  93  SDN  Sudan
t5  CAN Canada  54  KEN  Kenya  94  SWZ  Swaziland
16  CAF Cent. Afr. Rep  55  KOR  Korea  95  SWE  Sweden
17  TCD Chad  56  KWT  Kuwait  96  CHE  Switzerlan
18  CHL Chile  57  LSO  Lesotho  97  SYR  Syria
19  COL Colombia  58  LBR  Liberia  98  OAN  Taiwan
20  COG Congo  59  LUX  Luxembourg  99  TZA  Tanzania
21  CRI Costa Rica  60  MDG  Madagascar  100  THA  Thailand
22  CIV Cote D'Ivoire  61  MWI  Malawi  101  TGO  Togo
23  CYP Cyprus  62  MYS  Malaysia  102  TTO  Trin. and
24  DEN Denmark  63  MLI  Mali  103  TUN  Tunisia
25  DOM Dominican Rep.  64  MLT  Malta  104  TUR  Turkey
26  ECU Ecuador  65  MRT  Mauritania  105  UGA  Uganda
27  EGY Egypt  66  MUS  Mauritius  106  GBR  Great Brit
28  SLV El Salvador  67  MEX  Mexico  107  USA  United Sta
29  ETH Ethiopia  68  MAR  Morocco  108  URY  Uruguay
30  FJI Fiji  69  MOZ  Mozambique  109  VEN  Venezuela
31  FIN Finland  70  NLD  Netherland  110  YEM  Yemen
32  FRA France  71  NZL  New Zealan  111  ZAR  Zaire
33  GAB Gabon  72  NIC  Nicaragua  112  ZMB  Zambia
34  GMB Gambia  73  NER  Niger  113  ZWE  Zimbabwe
35  DEU Germany  74  NGA  Nigeria  114  BUR  Burma
36  GHA Ghana  75  NOR  Norway  115  GUY  Guyana
37  GRC Greece  76  OMN  Oman  116  BEN  Benin
38  GTM Guatemala  77  PAK  Pakistan  117  HVO  Burkina Fa
39  GNB Guinea-Bissau  78  PAN  Panama  118  NPL  Nepal
79  PNG  Pap. New G  119  SUR  Suriname
35TABLE I
Sensitivity Results for Basic Variables
Non-Oil Countries
Regressions on Growth of Per Capita Income 1360-1989
Beta  Stan.Err.  T-Stat  N  R2  Other Incl. Vars.*
I-.vestm.ent  Share of GDP (':NV)
High21 19.555  2.845  6.87  89  .56  STDI,BMP,GOV
Low  12.762  3.070  4.16  97  .46  XSG,LI,,REVC
Real GDP per capita in 1960 (RGDP60)
High  -.299  .138  2.16  97  .50  LAAM,XSG,GOV
Low  -.541  .142  3.82  78  .60  GDC,BMP,LIT
Growth in Population (GPO)
High  -.131  .221  .59  100  .54  X22.LAAM,PRI
Low  -.546  .234  2.33  90  .56  X.BMP,MIX
Secondary School Enrollment Ratio in 1960 (SEC)
High  3.708  1.22Z  3.04  84  .55  X,GOV,GDC
Low  .572  1.208  .47  91  .64  B14P,LAAM,AFRICA
Regression on Investment Share 1960-1989
Beta  Stan.Err.  T-Stat  N  R2 Other Incl. Vars.**
Real GDP per capita in 1960 (RGDP60)  1960-1989
High  .007  .003  2.23  85  .07  GDC,SOC,STDI
Low  -. 010  .005  2.15  89  .25  CIVL,BMP.GOV
Growth in Population (GPO)  1960-1989
High  .006  .007  .82  93  .25  CIVL,LAAM,BMP
Low  -.016  .006  2.65  86  .09  S0C,STDI,GDC
Secondary School Enrollment Ratio in 1960 (SEC)  1960-1989
High  .059  .042  1.39  84  .15  CIVL,GDC,GOV
Low  -.003  .039  .07  90  .21  BMP,GOV,CIVL
*  INV, RGDP60. GPO, and SEC included in all Growth regressions
**  no additional variables included in the Investment regressions
21The  high  beta is  the  coefficient from  regression  which obtains  the  highest
beta bound in the extreme bounds analysis.  The low  beta is from the regression
which obtains the lowest beta bound.
22The  underlined  variables  show  additional  variables  which  make  the
coefiicient  of  interest  insignificant or  change  sign.  In  this  case  the




(excluding  oil countries)
Fastgrowers  Slowgr￿we￿s  t-srat
Share  of investment  in  GDP  0.23  0.17  5.18
Secondary  school  enrollment  rate  (1960)  0.30  0.10  5.46
Primary  school  enrollment  rate (1960)  0.90  0.54  6.10
Government  cOnsumption/  GDP  0.16  0.12  3.26
Inflation  rate  12.34  31.13  -1.74
Black  market  exchange  rate  premium  13.57  57.15  -3.79
Share  of  exports  to  GDP  0.32  0.23  2.31
Note:  Mean  growth  rate  - 1.92
Fastgrowers: Greater  than  the  mean  growth  rate.  (n  - 56)
Slowgrowers: Less  than  the  mean  growth  rate.  (n  =  53)
TABLE  3
CROSS-COUNTRY  CORRELATIONS
GYP  INV  RES**  X  GOV  Pt  BMP  REVC  CIVL
GYP  1.00  0,59*  0.73*  0.32*  0.09  -0.16  ￿0.38*  ￿0.36*  .. 0￿U*
INV  1.00  0.00  0.50*  0.28*  -0.04  .. Q43*  ￿0.40*  - 33*
RES**  1.00  0.09  -0.13  -0.17  -0.13  -0.16  -.
X  1.00  0.15  -0.15  ￿0.22*  ￿0.34*  - .23*
GOV  1.00  -0.16  -0.19  ￿0.29*  ￿'9
Pt  1.00  0.18  0.46*  0.02
BM.P  1.00  0.47*  0.38*
REVC  1.00  0.50'
C  IVL  ￿.zoo
**RES  The  residual  of the  OLS regression  of  average  per  capita  growth  (GYP)  on
the  I-Variables:  initial  income  (RGDP6O),  population  growth  (GPO),
secondard  school  enrollment  rate  (SEC),  and  the  investment  share  (INV).
*  significantly  different  from  zero  at the  0.05  significance  level.
37TABLE 4
Cross-Country Growth Regressions
Dependent Variab'e is Average Annual Growth Rate  of Per Capita Income
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Period  1960-29  1960-85  1960-89  1960-85  1960-85
Data Set  WB  SH  WB  WB  SH
Independent Variables
Constant  -. 83  2.01  .86  .47  2.05
(.85)  (.83)  (.89)  (1.18)  (1.16)
Initial GDP/Capita  -.351  -.69t  -.30t  -.40t  -.56#
RGDP60  (.14)  (.12)  (.11)  (.13)  (.13)
Investment Sh.  17.49J  9.31t  16.77#  13.44#  10.32t
INV  (2.68)  (2.08)  (2.62)  (3-13)  (2.50)
Popul. Growth  -.38  .08  -.53#  -.15  -.02
GPO  (.22)  (.18)  (.18)  (.19)  (.19)
Secondary Enroll.  3.17t  1.21  .63  .95
SEC  (1.29)  (1.17)  (1.26)  (1.25)
Primary Enroll.  1.79t  .91  1.02
PRI  (.58)  (.73)  (.70)
Goverrment Share  -6,370  -.59  -6.75#
GOV  (2.03)  (3.73)  (2.39)
Growth Gov Share  -.08
GSG  (.06)
Socialist Econ  -.25  -.21  - .15
SOC  (.38)  (.45)  (.44)
Revolution & Coup  -1.76t  -.86  -1.78#
REVC  (.52)  (.62)  (.60)
Africa Dummy  -1.24t  -1.36#  -1.821
AFRICA  (.37)  (.48)  (.46)
Latin America Dummy  -1.181  -1.34#  -1.521
LAAM  (.33)  (.38)  (.37)
Growth of Dom. Credit  .019t  .013  008
GDC  (.009)  (.008)  (.007)
Stan. Dev. Dom. Cred.  -.009t  -.006t  -.003
STDD  (.003)  (.003)  (.003)
Export Share Growth  .090  .023  -.027
XSG  (.052)  (.047)  (.046)
Civil Liberties  -.22  .01  .15
CIVL  (.11)  (.13)  (.13)
Number of Obs.  101  103  83  84  84
R2  .46  .68  .61  .67  .73
#-significant at 5t,  Standard errors in parentheses
Regressions 1,3,& 4 use World Bank data for growth and national accounts while
numbers 2 & 5 use Summers-Peston (1988)  data
38TABLE 5-A
Sensitivity Results for Fiscal Variables
Regressions on Growth of Per Capita Income
Beta  Stan.Err.  T-Stat  N  R2 Other Incl. Vars,*
Government Consumption Share  (GOV) 1960-1989
High  -1.621  3.355  .48  78  .61  BMP,MIX,AFRICA
Low  -7.189  3.611  1.99  78  .59  LAAM,BMP,GDC
Government Consumption Share minus Def. and Educ. Exp (GOVX) 1974-'989
High  - 8.648  6.741  1.28  63  .62  STDD,AFRICA,LAAM 23
Low  -21.024  7.482  2.81  59  .58  BMP,GDC,PI
Total Government Expenditure Share (TEX) 1974-1989
High  - 2.750  2.055  1.34  67  .54  X.BMP,GDC
Low  - 7.784  2.135  3.65  82  .51  X,MIX,LAAM
Central Government Surplus/Deficit as Share  (DEF)  1974-1989
High  22.495  4.863  4.62  78  .52  AFRICA,X,MIX
Low  13.044  5.584  2.34  65  .57  STDD,BMP,REVC
Low  5.297  6.181  .86  53  .58  XTX,BKP,MTX
(with  tax receipt  variables)
Growth of Government Consumption Spending (GG) 1960-1989
High  .271  .054  5.01  89  .66  REVC,BMP,GOV
Low(exXG)  .106  .052  2.03  85  .64  GDC,STDD,X
Low(in.XG)  .017  .012  1.41  95  .98  XG,XSG,GOV
*  INV, RGDP, GPO, and SEC included in all Growth regressions.
Underlined variables show additions  which make coefficient insig. or change
signs
23  If one excludem the continent dumies,  the extreme  bound procedure
chooses X, BMS, STDD as  Z-variables.  This yields a  coefficient on  GOVX of -13.5
and a t-statistics of 1.81,  which is not significant at the 0.05 level.
39TABLE 5-B
Sensitivity Results for Fiscal Variables
Regressions on Investment Share
Beta  Stan.Err.  T-Stat  N  R2 Other Incl. Vars.**
3overnment Consumption Share  (GOV)  1960-1989
High  .309  .114  2.71  101  .09  LAAM,MIX,STDI
Low  .083  .110  .76  78  .36  X,BKP,GDC
Government Consumption Share  (GOVX)  1974-1989
High  -.004  .175  .03  75  .09  AFRICA,LAAH.CIVL24
Low  -.616  .203  3.03  59  .18  BMP,GDC.CIVL
Total Government Expenditure Share (TEX) 1974-1989
High  .119  .056  2.14  86  .08  CIVL,SOC,MIX
Low  .039  .052  .74  85  .20  X,AFRICA,LAAM
Central Government Surplus/Deficit as Share  (DEF)  1974-1989
High  .050  .165  .31  74  .08  AFRICA,MIX,BMP
Low  -.067  .191  .35  65  .04  STDI,BMP,GDC
* no additional variables included in the Investment regressions
Underlined variables show additions which make coefficient insignificant or
change signs
24  If one  does  not  allow the  extreme  bounds  procedure to  choose  the
continent  dummies,  the  coefficient on  GOVX  becomes  insignificant with  the
inclusion  of STDI.
40TABLE 6-A
Sensitivity Results for Trade Variables
Regressions on Growth of Per Capita Income
Beta  Stan.Err.  T-Stat  N  R2  Other Incl. Vars.*
Exports as percentage of CDP (X)  1960-1989
High  1.3549  .7782  1.74  97  .55  GO",AFRICA
Low  - .2641  .9659  .27  79  .59  PI,GDC,BMP
Imports as percentage of GDP (M)  1960-1989
High  1.6395  .8982  1.83  !5  .53  GOV,AFRICA
Low  -1.8000  1.0722  1.68  78  .58  PI.GDC,BMP
Growth of Exports (avg.  annual)  (GX)  1960-1989
High  .2517  .0349  7.21  96  .71  AREA,REVC,GOV
Low (exGG) .2141  .0381  5.62  78  .71  GOV,GDC,BMP
Low (inGG) .0085  .0103  .83  86  .98  GSG,GG,STDD
Growth of Imports (avg.  annual)  (GM)  1960-1989
High  .2845  .0424  6.71  95  .69  GOV,LAAM,GSG
Low (exGG) .1940  .0454  4.27  86  .71  STDD,LAAM.AFRICA
Low (inGG) .0137  .0184  .74  87  .97  GSG,GG,BMP
Openness measure based on factor adjusted trade-Leamer (LEAM1) 1974-1989
High  -.8478  1.5798  .54  49  .58  AFRICA.LAAM.PI
Low  -3.3110  1.4062  2.35  38  .74  AFRICA,LAAM.G3VX
Trade Distortion based on H-O deviations-Leamer (LEAM2) 1974-1989
High  .5659  1.8665  .30  49  .58  AFRICA.LAAM,PI
Low  -5.8597  2.1404  2.74  38  .63  AFRICA,BMS.-EE
Black Market Exchange Rate Premium (BMP) 1960-1989
High  -.0014  .0026  .53  91  .58  PI.SOC.MIX
Low  -.0053  .0030  1.78  79  .59  LAAM,REVC,OC
Real Exchange Rate Distortion-Dollar (RERD) 1974-1989
High(wdum) -.0059  .0057  1.04  81  .66  AFRICA.LAAM..EF
High  -.0167  .0069  2.42  64  .55  GOVX,PI,STDD
Low  -.0227  .0071  3.18  74  .44  PI,STDI.DEE
*INV, RGDP, GPO, and SEC included in all Growth regressions
Underlined variables show additions  which make coefficient insig. or change
signs
41TABLE 6-B
Sensitivity Results for Trade Variables
Regressions on Investment Share
Beta  Stan.Err.  T-Stat  N  R2 Other Incl. Vars.**
Exports as percentage of GDP (X)
High  .1600  .0298  5.31  86  .26  GDC,STDI
Low  .0951  .0244  3.90  100  .35  GOV,REVC,STDI
openness measure based on factor adjusted trade-Leamer (LEAMI) 1974-1989
High  .152  .053  2.89  47  .18  LAAM.STDI,GDC
Low  .104  .049  2.11  47  .30  AFRICA,REVC.GDC
Trade Distortion based on H-O deviations-Lear r (LKAM2) 1974-1989
High  .240  .044  5.44  47  .42  LAAH,GDC.CIVL
Low  .177  .038  4.60  49  .55  AFRICA,CIVL.REVC
Black Market Exchange Rate Premium (BMP) 1960-1989
High  - .00020  .0001  1.58  78  .19  GDC,GOV.REVC
Low  - .00042  .0001  3.98  81  .21  LAAM,MIX,STDD
Real Exchange Rate Distortion-Dollar (RERD) 1974-1989
High  - .0000  .0002  .01  64  .25  AFRICA,GDC,GOVX
Low  - .0005  .0002  2.85  91  .11  LAAM,MIX.GDC
** no additional variables included in the Investment  regressions
Underlined variables show additions  which make coefficient insig. or change
s igns
42TABLE 7
Sensitivity Results for Monetary, Exchange Rate, and Political Variables
Regressions on Growth of Per  Capita Income 1960-1989
Beta  Stan.Err.  T-Stat  N  _2  Other Incl. Vars.*
growth of  Domestic Credit  (GDC)
High  .0011  .0061  .18  85  .66  LAAM,MIX,AFRICA
Low  -.0054  .0065  .83  85  .57  X,SOC
Standard Deviation of the Rate of Inflation (STDI)
High  -.00027  .0007  .37  101  .49  LAAM,REVC,MIX
Low  - .00124  .0007  1.84  85  .59  GDC,CIVL,REVC
Revolution and Coups  (REVC)
High  .6391  .7699  .83  79  .60  GDC,BMP,PI
Low  -1.4701  .6371  2.31  101  .52  AFRICA
Civil Liberties (higher-less  CIVL)
High  .1043  .1458  .72  79  .63  GDC,BMP,AFRICA
Low  -.3491  .1268  2.75  101  .52  MIX.LAAM
*INV. RGDP, GPO, and SEC included in all Growth regressions
Sensitivity Results for Monetary, Exchange Rate, and Political Variables
Regression on Investment Share 1960-1989
Beta  Stan.Err.  T-Stat  N  R2 Other Incl. Vars.
Growth of Domestic Credit  (GDC)  1960-1989
High  .00041  .0003  1.54  85  .18  CIVL,REVC,SOC
Low  .00003  .0003  .10  86  .03  SOC,MIX
Standard Deviation of the Rate of Inflation (STDI)  1960-1989
High  .00006  .00002  2.57  92  .32  REVC.LAAM,BMP
Low  -.00001  .00002  .55  105  .08  AFRICA,SOC,MIX
Revolution and Coups  (REVC) 1960-1989
High  -.0347  .0228  1.52  88  .34  X,CIVL,STDD 25
Low  - .0880  .0241  3.65  85  .17  SOC,MIX.GDC
Civil Liberties (higher-less  CIVL)  1960-1989
High  .0029  .0041  .70  85  .27  REVC,AFRICA.GDC
Low  -.0108  .0032  3.38  88  .15  SOC,MIX,STDD
25 If the extreme  bounds procedure  is not allowed to choose CIVL.  the
coefficient on REVC is robustly negative even when the procedure is allowed to
choose continent dummies.
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